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Abstract
Central banks have become more and more transparent about their
monetary policy making process. In the central bank transparency lit-
erature the distinction between actual and perceived central bank trans-
parency is often lacking. However, as perceptions are crucial for the ac-
tions of economic agents this distinction matters. A discrepancy between
actual and perceived transparency may exist because of incomplete or in-
correct transparency knowledge and other (psychological) factors. Even
ﬁnancial experts, the most important channel through which the central
bank can inﬂuence the economy, might suﬀer from misaligned perceptions.
We investigate the mismatch between actual and perceived transparency
and its relevance by analyzing data of a Dutch household survey on the
European Central Bank’s transparency. To beneﬁt from higher trans-
parency perceptions the European Central Bank might feel tempted to
stress its transparency strengths, but hide its transparency weaknesses.
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11 Introduction
A worldwide trend amongst central banks is the increasing degree of trans-
parency about their monetary policy making process. Central bank trans-
parency is important because it holds independent central banks accountable for
their actions. In addition, there are likely to be economic eﬀects from central
bank transparency.1 For example, through improved credibility more trans-
parency could lead to better anchored inﬂation expectations. This might for
example make long-term interest rates and inﬂation more stable (which would
result in more eﬃcient investment and pricing decisions of ﬁrms) and easier to
predict.
The distinction between actual and perceived transparency is not often made in
the central bank transparency literature. However such a division is important
in case of a diﬀerence between these two measures of transparency. Some ﬁrst
empirical proof of the existence of such a discrepancy is given by De Haan et
al. (2005).
It is important to analyze the manner in which transparency perceptions are
being formed. First, misaligned transparency perceptions, through their eﬀect
on the actions of economic agents, could lead to suboptimal economic outcomes.
For example, when people’s transparency perceptions are lower than the actual
transparency practice of the central bank anchoring of inﬂation expectations
might be worse than in case of aligned perceptions. Second, independent central
banks need to be transparent to be accountable for their actions. Bringing
transparency perceptions in line with reality improves the degree to which the
central bank can be accountable.
There are two reasons for a mismatch between actual and perceived trans-
parency. First, knowledge about the actual transparency practice of central
banks might be incomplete or incorrect. If this would be the only reason for
a mismatch between actual and perceived transparency then it could be re-
solved relatively easily. The central bank would only need to improve its com-
munication on those aspects of transparency on which incomplete or incorrect
knowledge exists. However, psychological factors (e.g. belief perseverance, sam-
pling memories) are complicating the link between transparency knowledge and
perceptions. This second cause for misaligned perceptions is not that simply
resolved.
In the central bank transparency literature not enough attention has been paid
to the causes and consequences of misaligned transparency perceptions. We
contribute in several ways to the transparency literature. First, we use psycho-
logical insights to explain a potential mismatch between actual and perceived
central bank transparency. Second, by holding a questionnaire among the Cen-
tERpanel, which includes over 2000 Dutch households, we collect micro data
1An overview of the central bank transparency literature is provided by van der
Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger (2007).
2on people’s knowledge and perceptions of the transparency of the European
Central Bank (ECB). We use this data to get more insight into the central
bank transparency knowledge of the public at large and its determinants. In
addition, it is investigated to what extent knowledge about the ECB’s mone-
tary policy transparency is relevant for people’s transparency perceptions and
to what extent other factors might play a role in the formation of transparency
perceptions. Furthermore, the relevance of transparency perceptions from an
economic viewpoint is tested empirically.
A visual summary of the expected causes and consequences of perceived central
bank transparency is provided by Figure 1.
Figure 1: The causes and consequences of perceived central bank transparency
Note: Transparency knowledge inﬂuences transparency perceptions, which matter be-
cause through trust they aﬀect the inﬂation gap and the credibility gap. Psycholog-
ical and individual characteristics (e.g. degree of optimism, overconﬁdence, sampling
memories) are relevant too in explaining the formation and the eﬀects of transparency
perceptions.
Knowledge of central bank transparency is a determinant of transparency per-
ceptions, but other (psychological) factors inﬂuence transparency perceptions as
well. Transparency perceptions in their turn might aﬀect important economic
variables, such as the inﬂation gap (the diﬀerence between perceived and actual
inﬂation) and the credibility gap (the diﬀerence between expected and targeted
inﬂation), through their eﬀect on people’s trust in the ECB.2 More speciﬁc this
2We deﬁne trust as "...one’s belief and expectation about the likelihood of having
a desirable action performed by the trustee." (Das and Teng, 1998, p.494). Here the
3transmission channel works as follows. Higher central bank transparency is one
of the possible ways in which a central bank might improve its credibility. Peo-
ple have more trust in the monetary policy of a relatively credible central bank.
The lower inﬂation perceptions and expectations that might result would lead
to a lower inﬂation and credibility gap. Psychological insights might be helpful
in explaining the transmission from perceptions to other variables.
We start the remainder of this paper by theoretically explaining Figure 1 (Sec-
tion 2). It is clariﬁed into more detail why a disparity between actual and
perceived central bank transparency might exist, the possible channels through
which it impacts the economy and whether learning makes a diﬀerence. Then
we try to test empirically for the hypothesized relationships by reading down
Figure 1 from top to bottom. The data and survey methodology are discussed
in Section 3. In Section 4 we ﬁrst provide more insight into the self-assessed
and actual knowledge about the ECB’s transparency (the ﬁrst box in Figure 1:
"Knowledge of central bank transparency") before looking into the perceived
ECB transparency in Section 5 (the second box in Figure 1: "Perception of
central bank transparency"). Then, in Section 6, the relevance of investigating
transparency perceptions is analyzed by looking at its relationship with the in-
ﬂation gap and credibility gap via trust (boxes "trust" and "inﬂation gap and
credibility gap" in Figure 1). Last, we conclude (Section 7).
2 Theory
If one assumes that agents are rational, their transparency perceptions should be
in line with the actual transparency practice of the central bank. But in reality
agents might not behave rationally, in the sense of knowing everything and
processing information "correctly". Psychological insights are helpful to get a
feeling why a mismatch between actual and perceived central bank transparency
might exist.
"...Because psychology systematically explores human judgment, behavior and
well-being, it can teach us important facts of how humans diﬀer from the way
they are traditionally described by economists..." (Rabin, 1998, p.11)
In the literature on central bank transparency it is often assumed that by giving
more public information about the central bank’s monetary policy the degree
of actual central bank transparency is enhanced. This assumption holds as
long as one views central bank transparency as something that is measurable,
for example by constructing indices that measure facts like whether relevant
economic data is published or not. There is however always some judgement
involved in the construction of transparency indices. This concerns the inclusion
as well as the weighing of various aspects of monetary policy making on which
the central bank could be transparent about. Throughout the paper we abstain
trustee is the European Central Bank. We use this deﬁnition of trust throughout the
paper.
4from measurement problems and assume that measures of actual central bank
transparency are correct. It is shown that even then, transparency perceptions
might not be in line with the actual degree of central bank transparency. Not
only lack of transparency knowledge and incorrect transparency knowledge, but
also psychological factors can explain misaligned transparency perceptions.
2.1 Reasons for misaligned transparency perceptions
The assumption that economic agents are rational, in the sense of knowing all
the information provided and processing all the information in similar ways, is
in our view too strong. A mismatch between actual and perceived transparency
may exist because of two reasons. First, a lack of knowledge or even incorrect
knowledge about something as speciﬁc as the transparency of the central bank
is probably present. Second, people process and edit the information that does
reach them, in diﬀerent ways. Psychological factors may play a role explaining
misaligned transparency perceptions and why perceptions diﬀer between people.
The insights of several behavioral economics papers can be used to support this
standpoint.
First, a psychological ﬁnding is that people often disregard new information
that is not in line with their previous beliefs (Rabin, 1998, p.26). Applied to
the topic discussed here this means that if someone beliefs that the central
bank is ambiguous about its monetary policy making practice then he or she
may not pay suﬃcient attention to evidence pointing in the opposite direction.
Information that conﬁrms their prior belief is noticed more.
Second, people might even suﬀer from what is called in psychology a conﬁr-
mation bias, which causes some anchoring of beliefs. Now new information is
misinterpreted in such a way that it conﬁrms prior beliefs. This belief persever-
ance might worsen a central bank’s possibility to build up credibility through
becoming more transparent. It will be diﬃcult to teach people something new
that is not in line with their previous beliefs. As Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997) point out, the self-serving bias is present when people view the envi-
ronment diﬀerently. Although the central bank provides the same information
to everyone, economic agents interpret information diﬀerently because of their
dissimilar views on the environment. Although heuristics make it easier to per-
form complex tasks, they may lead people to make large mistakes (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974).
Third, sampling memories may be relevant here as well. Camerer (p.595) with
good reason says the following.
"...much evidence suggests that human perception deviates systematically from
the camera benchmark and memory deviates from the computer benchmark."
(Camerer, 2003, p.595).
Although it is logical to use your memory to form perceptions, because mem-
ories are a sample of real life experience, it will most likely lead to "incorrect"
perceptions. Some experiences are easier retrievable from memory than others.
5People give a disproportional weight to evidence that they can remember the
best and the liveliest, even when better sources of information are available (e.g.
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). How information is processed is likely to de-
pend on the stock of old information that people possess. Exciting newspapers
headings like "The central bank mumbles" are relatively easily retrieved from
memory. In addition, media coverage is not random; unexpected steps of the
central bank get relatively more attention. The public will base its opinion on
this kind of media information as it can be obtained with little eﬀort, whereas
searching central bank publications and websites for information might be too
cumbersome.
Last, individual characteristics may be relevant. Psychological research (e.g.
Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997 and Malmendier and Tate, 2005) has shown
that people are overconﬁdent in what they believe and this overconﬁdence is
pervasive. For example, people might get overconﬁdent about their belief that
the central bank is intransparent, which makes it more diﬃcult to change these
perceptions. As people vary in their degree of conﬁdence, the ease by which
perceptions can be changed varies for each person. Another example of an
individual characteristic that might be relevant is the extent to which one is
optimistic. Intuitively one would think that those people that are relatively
optimistic will have a more positive view on the degree to which the central
bank is transparent, whereas pessimists are more prone to have a bad opinion
about the central bank’s transparency.
2.2 Implications of misaligned transparency perceptions
Despite the above, the distinction between actual and perceived transparency
has been absent in the central bank transparency literature for a long time.
Recently, Geraats (2007) theoretically showed that it is important to make a
distinction between these two forms of transparency and that the desirability
of transparency depends on which concept is being used. Actual transparency
reduces the uncertainty faced by the private sector by reducing the noise of
communication and is therefore desirable. In contrast, perceived transparency
might make markets more sensitive to information and is therefore not always
desirable. It is shown that although clarity about the inﬂation target is desirable,
this does not hold for the output gap target and supply shocks.
Perceptions of the central bank’s transparency are important as they might
aﬀect the economy. For example, when people’s perceived transparency rises,
the central bank’s credibility might improve, people’s trust in the monetary
policy of the central bank might rise and as a result inﬂation expectations may
become better anchored. However, psychological factors might disturb the eﬀect
of transparency perceptions on inﬂation perceptions and inﬂation expectations
via trust.
First, whether people have trust in the central bank is likely to depend on
many psychological factors, like belief perseverance and sampling memories. In
addition, individual personal circumstances, like unemployment, also have an
impact on trust in the central bank (Hudson, 2006).
6Second, people’s inﬂation perceptions are aﬀected by psychological factors. Af-
ter the introduction of the Euro, people perceived inﬂation as being much higher
than it actually was and even when actual inﬂation reached lower levels, it was
still perceived as being high for a long time. Happiness research has revealed
that inﬂation has a sizeable eﬀect on people’s happiness (Frey and Stutzer,
2002). Shiller (1997) points out that the public at large worries about diﬀerent
eﬀects of inﬂation as compared to economists. The public concentrates on the
detrimental eﬀects associated with higher inﬂation and forgets that their nomi-
nal income will increase as well. If people sample memories, price increases are
more easily retrieved from memory because they made a bigger impression than
price decreases. This will lead to incorrect perceptions of inﬂation. Incorrect
inﬂation perceptions are also present when people give a disproportional weight
to the products that they buy often. Unconsciously, people may use this infor-
mation as a conﬁrmation of their beliefs and not search further for more reliable
information. Another good example of a potentially important psychological
factor is the so-called false contribution error. The idea is that when inﬂation is
low people will feel it is their own achievement, whereas when inﬂation is high
they sense it is due to the central bank’s policy. The false contribution error
clouds the perceptions the public has of the central bank and its achievements.
Third, expectations of future inﬂation are most likely also inﬂuenced by most of
the psychological factors mentioned before. For example, price rises are more
likely to be retrievable from memory and therefore likely to bias inﬂation ex-
pectations upward.
To summarize, transparency perceptions are expected to aﬀect inﬂation percep-
tions and expectations through their impact on trust in the central bank but
other (psychological) factors cloud this eﬀect. In case transparency perceptions
are lower than actual transparency, the central bank might want to raise trans-
parency perceptions if it believes that it improves people’s trust in the central
bank, and thereby reduces the inﬂation gap and the credibility gap. However, if
transparency perceptions were to be higher than the actual transparency prac-
tice of a central bank it might not be itching to change matters (and this is
rational behavior for the central bank). As a public institution the central bank
has an obligation to the public to take care that perceptions are in line with
reality. However there might be a moral hazard problem. Possible economic
gains from misaligned perceptions (e.g. lower inﬂation expectations, which in-
creases the central bank’s eﬀectiveness) might hold the central bank back from
clarifying matters. The central bank might face a perverse incentive to not be
too transparent about its transparency practices.
Next, we analyze to what extent learning can eliminate the mismatch between
actual and perceived transparency.
2.3 Financial experts and learning
One could argue that misaligned perceptions are not so relevant for two reasons.
First, by learning people will eventually form the correct perceptions. So the
issue of misaligned perceptions is only a temporary problem. Second, economic
7experts are the most important economic actors and they will get things right.
Let us ﬁrst take a look at learning. Central bank transparency and learning
are related to each other in dual ways. On the one hand, learning inﬂuences
the degree to which the central bank is perceived to be transparent. People
can learn in many diﬀerent ways, which may lead to diverse perceptions. But
learning cannot fully evade the eﬀect of psychological factors on the formation
of transparency perceptions because people are often unaware of the psycho-
logical biases they suﬀer from. For the central bank this complicates it to get
perceptions in line with their actual transparency practice. The fact that people
process information in diﬀerent ways makes it even more diﬃcult to construct a
beneﬁcial communication policy. When people are unaware of the bias in their
perceptions, learning will not be of much help.
On the other hand, transparency itself is likely to inﬂuence learning. One rela-
tively new strand in the theoretical transparency literature looks at the eﬀects
of increased transparency within learning models. Because of criticism on ra-
tional expectations (every economic agent behaves rationally and uses the same
model of the economy) models that include learning agents were constructed.
Agents are provided with learning algorithms which they update based on new
information (Evans and Honkapohja, 2005). For example, the private sector
could be learning about the model that the central bank uses in conducting
monetary policy, whereas both the central bank and the public may have to
learn about the way the economy works. Svensson (2003) puts forward the idea
that transparency may have a large impact on learning by the private sector
to form the right expectations about the economy and inﬂation. Overall, the
learning papers ﬁnd that central bank transparency can be a helpful tool to
improve private sector learning and thereby the decisions that it makes (e.g.
Orphanides and Williams, 2005).
Financial experts work regularly with economic matters, so they are expected to
learn faster as they would beneﬁt more from it. Some believe that although the
general public might have a low degree of knowledge about the central bank’s
monetary policy and possess misaligned transparency perceptions, this does
not hold for ﬁnancial experts. In that case the impact of misaligned perceptions
might not be so big. This idea can be dismissed based on psychological ﬁndings.
Although learning might “improve” perceptions, psychological evidence shows
us that even experts suﬀer from biases and their beliefs might depart from reality
as well (e.g. Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).
By combining some of the ﬁndings of De Haan et al. (2005), we can illustrate
that this train of thought seems to hold for transparency perceptions too (see
Table 1). Financial experts were asked to rank central banks according to their
level of transparency. The results show that the US Fed is perceived to be much
more transparent than the Bank of England, while a transparency measure
based on the actual disclosure practice of central banks demonstrates that the
Bank of England is the most transparent one. This ﬁnding indicates that even
ﬁnancial experts might suﬀer from misaligned perceptions. It might be that
for experts, who are confronted with a lot of information, it is even easier to,
unconsciously, distill information that is in line with their previous beliefs. As
8Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) show, trained professionals are not immune to
the conﬁrmation bias. In addition, it is more likely that people are overconﬁdent
when they regard themselves experts in a particular ﬁeld.
Table 1. A transparency mismatch
Transparency ranking Actual transparency Perceived transparency
1 Bank of England US Federal Reserve
2 European Central Bank Deutsche Bundesbank
3 US Federal Reserve European Central Bank
4 Deutsche Bundesbank Bank of England
Note: Central banks are ranked according to their degree of transparency. The “actual
transparency” column is based on the disclosure indicator of De Haan and Amtenbrink
in De Haan et al. (2005, Table 4.2, p.101). The “perceived transparency” column is
based on De Haan et al. (2005, Table 4.4, p.102).
For central bankers it is important to know whether the perceptions of those peo-
ple with economic jobs are misaligned because their decision-making has a huge
inﬂuence on the economy. Economic experts inﬂuence the way in which public’s
perceptions are being formed. For example, ﬁnancial journalists are likely to
impact the transparency perceptions of the public through their newspapers ar-
ticles. It is less likely that the public will collect its information directly from the
central bank’s publications and website. As economic experts are making (and
inﬂuencing) a large part of economic decision-making, the harmony between
their transparency perceptions and the actual practice of the central bank is of
special interest to the central bank.
In order to test whether such a gap between actual and perceived transparency
exists in practice, we have performed a questionnaire amongst Dutch households
on the transparency of the ECB. The data is especially rich in providing infor-
mation about the presence and the strength of the indirect transmission channel
we look at throughout this paper (aﬀecting the economy through transparency
perceptions) of households. But the data provide also some indications of the
relevance of this indirect transmission channel via ﬁnancial experts. The data
and survey methodology will be discussed in the next section.
3 Data and survey methodology
The data for this research project was obtained by setting out an internet-based
survey through the CentERpanel, which is a more or less continuous panel.
This panel is run by CentERdata, which is a research institute belonging to the
CentER group at Tilburg University. CentERdata is specialized in performing
internet-based surveys.
It is made sure that the members of the CentERpanel are representative of
the Dutch society. CentERdata selects new members by phone. Those who do
not have internet access yet can participate as well. By using their television
9screen as a monitor and using a set-top box which they in case of no internet
access receive they can answer the questions. The CentERpanel consists of
over 2000 Dutch households, which remain panel members for longer periods.3
Questionnaires on various topics are set out throughout the weekend (from
Friday afternoon until Tuesday night).
Our questionnaire was sent out to 2534 members of the CentERpanel (16 years
and older) from Friday afternoon the 1st of June 2007 until Tuesday night the
5th of June 2007. The response rate is 71%, which corresponds to 1800 persons.
Compared to the response rates which are common in other forms of surveys
(e.g. Baruch, 1999 and Cook et al., 2000), the response rate to this continu-
ous internet-based survey is very high. Asking questions through an internet
survey has several advantages. For example, people can answer the questions
anonymously which prevents a bias towards socially desirable answers. They
can decide themselves when they have enough time to ﬁll in the questionnaires.
Questions are asked in the same way to all participants. And, if desirable, it is
possible to repeat surveys by asking the same persons again to obtain longitu-
dinal data. Last, respondents don’t need to answer background questions every
time they ﬁll in a questionnaire.4
The age of the respondents in our sample is on average 49.6, with the youngest
participant being 16 and the oldest 92. With a share of 53.6%, males are in
the majority. On average the respondents’ households earn a monthly income
of 2554 Euro. Of the respondents 34.5% has had a high degree of education
(either a higher vocational education or an university education) and 11% deals
every day with ﬁnancial, economic, or monetary matters during working hours.
Possible implications of the slight overrepresentation of males, highly educated
people, older people, and higher income households will be discussed in the last
section of this paper.
The questions in the survey, which were pretested on consistent comprehen-
siveness by CentERdata, cover various matters on the ECB’s transparency. In
this paper we focus on the questions on the knowledge and perceptions of the
ECB’s transparency and on the possible eﬀects of transparency perceptions.
Perceived transparency may be misaligned for two reasons: 1) incomplete or
incorrect transparency knowledge, and 2) psychological factors, which disturb
the transmission from knowledge to perceptions.
Section 4 deals with the questions that measured people’s knowledge of the
transparency of the ECB. In Section 5 it is analyzed to what extent knowledge
of the ECB’s transparency translates into perceptions of transparency and which
role other factors play in the formation of transparency perceptions. In Section
6 we use the responses to questions on trust, inﬂation expectations and inﬂation
perceptions to discuss the relevance of misaligned transparency perceptions for
economic outcomes.
3Some of these households participate with more than one member, each with their
own ID-number.
4More details on the CentERpanel can be found on http://www.uvt.nl/center
data/en/.
104 Knowledge of central bank transparency
We have used several ways to measure Dutch households’ knowledge about the
ECB’s transparency. First, they were asked to make a self-assessment of their
knowledge about the ECB’s transparency (Section 4.1). Second, the depth
and correctness of their transparency knowledge has been measured by asking
questions about the actual transparency practice of the ECB (Section 4.2). A
mismatch between the actual and perceived transparency by the main economic
actors is of special interest as these economic agents determine to a large extent
economic outcomes. As poor transparency knowledge is partly responsible for
this mismatch, we look at the transparency knowledge of "economic experts"
into more detail (Section 4.3).
4.1 Self-assessed transparency knowledge
Before asking questions about central bank transparency we checked the share
of people who are aware of the existence of the ECB which turned out to be
67%. Actually more people are aware of the existence of the Dutch central bank
(De Nederlandsche Bank): 9 out of 10 people. Throughout the questionnaire
people could respond "I don’t know" to all the questions regarding the ECB,
such that guessing the correct answers is prevented and a clear picture of the
lack of knowledge is achieved.
We have asked people to judge their own knowledge on four aspects, which they
ranked on a ﬁve point scale (from high to low assessed knowledge): 1) their own
ﬁnancial situation, 2) ﬁnancial matters in general, 3) economic developments,
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Figure 2: Respondents’ self-assessed knowledge
Not surprisingly, as it is a more specialized topic, survey participants judge
11their knowledge of the ECB’s transparency as being the worst. The majority of
respondents report to have bad or very bad transparency knowledge (32% and
19%), 30% gives as answer “neutral”, whereas there are some people who judge
themselves as having a high knowledge (5%) or even a very high knowledge
(1%).
Table 2 gives an overview of the degreeto which various judgements of knowledge
are related. Knowledge about the transparency of the ECB has the strongest,
positive, correlation with assessed knowledge about economic developments in
general (0.54), closely followed by the correlation with assessed knowledge about
ﬁnancial matters in general (0.47). The correlation with the assessed knowledge
of people’s own ﬁnancial situation is only about half as strong.
Table 2. Correlation of the various knowledge assessments
Knowledge about...
(A) (B) (C) (D)
(A) economic developments 1.00 - - -
(B) own ﬁnancial situation 0.49 1.00 - -
(C) ﬁnancial matters in general 0.66 0.62 1.00 -
(D) transparency of the ECB 0.54 0.26 0.47 1.00
Note: Respondents’ self-assessed knowledge, scale from 1 to 5 (1=very poor, 2=poor,
3=neutral, 4=good, 5=very good). The "I don’t know"-responses are not included
in this correlation calculation.
We have investigated what explains the knowledge about the ECB’s trans-
parency. Table 3 column 1 contains the results based on 1525 observations
("no opinion"-respondents are excluded from the analysis).5 Not surprisingly,
knowing of the existence of the ECB is relevant. In addition, ceteris paribus,
self-assessed transparency knowledge is signiﬁcantly higher for those who are
older, male, not having a job, living in less urbanized regions and being more
optimistic. Education, income, social class and region are insigniﬁcant. A quite
intuitive ﬁnding is that transparency knowledge increases with age and assessed
optimism. The gender eﬀect may be explained by the higher degree of overcon-
ﬁdence of males (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001) and them fulﬁlling economic
jobs more often. People with a job may assess their transparency knowledge
lower because they might make a more realistic, lower judgement of their trans-
parency knowledge or because they have had less time to invest in this type of
knowledge.
5Appendix A contains a description of all the explanatory variables used throughout
the paper.
12Table 3. Self-assessed knowledge about the ECB’s transparency:
ordered probit analyses
(1) (2)
Age .01** (0.00) .01** (0.00)
Gender .23** (0.00) -.01 (0.89)
Education .02 (0.83) .03 (0.68)
Income .02 (0.14) -.02 (0.31)
Job -.17** (0.02) -.22** (0.00)
Social class .01 (0.82) -.05 (0.12)
Urbanization -.06** (0.01) -.09** (0.00)
Region .10 (0.11) .17** (0.01)
Optimist .11** (0.00) .04 (0.28)
ECB known .53** (0.00) .35** (0.00)
Economic job -.01 (0.89)
Economic expert .32** (0.00)
Economic knowledge (SA) .78** (0.00)
Log likelihood -1856 -1617
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.17
N 1525 1522
Note: P-values between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a 5%-
level. SA=self-assessed. The explained variable is a person’s self-assessed knowledge
about the ECB’s transparency, scaled from 1 to 5 (1=very poor, 2=poor, 3=neutral,
4=good, 5=very good). See appendix A for the deﬁnitions of the explanatory variables.
The number of observations (N) is lower in model 2 because persons who did not report
their self-assessed "economic knowledge" could not be included in the analysis.
Table 3 column 2 contains an extended regressions that includes indicators of
economic expertise. The explanatory power of the model rises a lot. Having
an "economic job" in the sense of being confronted with ﬁnancial, monetary
and economic matters during working hours is not relevant per se for people’s
assessed transparency knowledge. What is needed is "economic expertise": eco-
nomic work experience on a daily basis. Despite being broadly deﬁned, economic
expertise is signiﬁcantly related to higher self-assessed transparency knowledge.
Another variable we add is people’s self-assessed economic knowledge. Those
respondents with a relatively high degree of self-assessed economic knowledge
assess their transparency knowledge to be relatively high as well. This might to
some extent be caused by people’s degree of optimism which might be relevant
for both their self-assessed transparency knowledge (the dependent variable) as
well as their self-assessed economic knowledge (an explanatory variable). This
explains the insigniﬁcance of the optimist variable in model 2. Another variable
which is now not signiﬁcant anymore is gender. One explanation is that eco-
nomic jobs and education have traditionally been and still are men-dominated
and by correcting for diﬀerences in economic knowledge and jobs, the diﬀerence
between men and woman disappears. In model 2 the region dummy is signif-
13icant. Holding other factors constant, those people living in the West of the
Netherlands assess their transparency knowledge to be relatively high.
4.2 Actual transparency knowledge
The knowledge of the ECB’s transparency is analyzed in more detail as well. We
gave survey participants various questions about the ECB’s transparency prac-
tice. To prevent guessing and to disentangle those persons that lack knowledge
from those persons who have either incorrect or correct knowledge, we added a
separate "I don’t know" response option in addition to the options "yes" and
"no". The questions cover the various aspects of transparency as distinguished
by Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006) (abbreviated by EG). Table 4 summarizes the
responses to the transparency questions.
Table 4. Actual knowledge about the ECB’s transparency (N=1800)
Response shares
yes no I don´t know
Political transparency
ECB’s goals laid down 44% ￿ 2% 54%
ECB’s main task is supporting the economy 32% 20% ￿ 47%
ECB’s main task is supporting price stability 46% ￿ 8% 46%
ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 10% ￿ 19% 71%
ECB is independent 35% ￿ 16% 49%
Economic transparency
ECB provides economic data 38% ￿ 5% 56%
ECB provides economic forecasts 39% ￿ 6% 55%
ECB provides economic models 24% ￿ 11% 65%
Procedural transparency
ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 17% ￿ 25% 58%
ECB provides comprehensive minutes 10% 18% ￿ 72%
ECB provides voting records 4% 28% ￿ 68%
Policy transparency
ECB announces interest rate decisions immediately 33% ￿ 11% 57%
ECB immediately explains the interest rate decision 31% ￿ 9% 60%
ECB tells future policy preferences 12% 20% ￿ 68%
Operational transparency
ECB provides information about relevant economic shocks 16% ￿ 14% 70%
ECB provides information about forecasting errors 7% 23% ￿ 70%
ECB provides information about its performance 23% 11% ￿ 65%
Note: The table shows the share of respondents answering "yes", "no" or "I don’t
know" to the various questions on the ECB’s transparency. The check mark (￿)
indicates which answer is correct according to EG(2006).
14The check mark (￿) indicates which answer is correct according to EG(2006). In
some cases, regarding some aspects of the ECB’s monetary policy transparency
the indices are not sophisticated enough. We will discuss these cases later on.
4.2.1 Political transparency
According to the EG-index the ECB receives the maximum score for political
transparency. The main objectives of the ECB are formally stated and priori-
tized: “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability.
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support the gen-
eral economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of
this Treaty.”.6 Sustainable and non-inﬂationary growth and a high level of em-
ployment are part of these objectives. The Governing Council clariﬁed in a press
release what is exactly meant by price stability, namely that the year-on-year
increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area
should be below, but close to 2% over the medium term.
On most questions about political transparency about half of the respondents
thinks to know the correct answer. The fact that the main goals of the ECB
are laid down is known very well by this "I know"-group. When asked whether
supporting the economy is the ECB’s most important task, a lot of people
incorrectly think this is indeed the case. When asking instead whether "price
stability is the ECB’s main goal" more people respond and of those respondents
a huge majority answers "yes".
Only few people think to know whether price stability is quantiﬁed. Of these
persons 2/3 say the ECB’s main goal is not quantiﬁed, while 1/3 says it is. EG
(2006) argue that price stability is quantiﬁed. However, this is not so obvious.
One could discuss the extent to which price stability is quantiﬁed. What is the
exact meaning of "close to but below 2%"?
While regarded as an important aspect of the monetary policy framework, only
half of the people thinks it knows whether the ECB can act independently or
not. But of these persons 30% actually questions the independence of the ECB.
As independence is often regarded as an important tool to build up credibility,
communication to increase and improve knowledge about it might be beneﬁcial.
4.2.2 Economic transparency
The ECB provides a lot of economic information: economic data, its forecasts
for inﬂation and output, and the economic models it uses. When compared to
political transparency a bit less respondents have knowledge about economic
transparency. But of the ones that report to possess knowledge about 80%
correctly respond that the ECB provides economic information and forecasts.
People are less sure about economic models. This is reﬂected both by a higher
6Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank, Art. 2. This protocol is annexed to the Treaty establishing
the European Community.
15amount of "I don’t know"-answers as well as a higher amount of incorrect
knowledge.
4.2.3 Procedural transparency
According to the ECB’s monetary policy strategy there is an important role
for (1) money and (2) a broadly based judgement of future price developments
and risks to price stability at a Euro area level. Although the ECB has made
its so-called "Two Pillar Strategy" strategy explicit in the Monthly Bulletin of
January 1999 (and therefore the maximum EG-index score is obtained), it is
obvious that the survey respondents feel interest rate decisions are not made in
such a clear fashion. Actually this response is in line with reality, as it is diﬃcult
to know what weights these two pillars get in reality, how these weights change
over time and what these pillars exactly consist of. The unclear and changing
weights may confuse people (De Haan et al., 2005, pp.16-25). Therefore the
answer "no" can be judged to be correct as well.
Less people have knowledge about whether minutes and voting records are being
published, but the ones that do have knowledge answer correctly that the ECB
does not report what was said during the Governing Council meetings and
what standpoint Council members had. Overall, a lot of the respondents lack
knowledge on procedural transparency, an aspect of monetary policy making on
which the ECB relatively intransparent.
4.2.4 Policy transparency
The ECB announces its monetary policy decisions at a press conference which
takes place immediately after the Governing Council meeting. The ECB’s pres-
ident then explains the decision that has been taken. The likely future policy
path is not made explicit by the ECB. Most respondents lack knowledge about
policy transparency (57-68%), especially about transparency about future pol-
icy preferences Policy transparency knowledge is not only missing depth but also
correctness. Unfortunately, of the persons thinking to have correct knowledge,
1 out of 3 give the incorrect answer.
4.2.5 Operational transparency
Operational transparency considers openness about how the ECB implements it
monetary policy actions. Knowledge on this aspect of monetary policy making
is very low (65-70%). Current macro-economic developments are analyzed in
the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin but a discussion of past forecast errors is absent.
The latter is known by more people than the previous fact. Policy outcomes are
discussed and evaluated in the Monthly Bulletin, but what role monetary policy
has played is not made explicit. It is debatable whether people should indeed
answer "yes" or "no" to the question "Does the ECB provide public information
about the extent to which it achieved her goals?".
16To summarize, we ﬁnd both a lack of ECB transparency knowledge as well
as incorrect knowledge. Before analyzing to what extent transparency knowl-
edge explains transparency perceptions, we ﬁrst investigate why transparency
knowledge diﬀers among respondents.
4.2.6 Explaining actual transparency knowledge
Actual transparency knowledge is measured by constructing knowledge indices
(KI’s). For each aspect of transparency we have constructed a KI. The higher
the number of correct answers about a speciﬁc aspect of transparency, the higher
the speciﬁc KI. A detailed description of the design of these KI’s is presented in
Appendix A, Table A2 and A3. The total KI ranges between 0 and 15. Based
on a sample of 1519 persons the degree of transparency knowledge is explained,
see Table 5.




Constant .02 (0.98) .07 (0.94)
Age .01* (0.05) .01 (0.10)
Gender .24 (0.24) .31 (0.18)
Education -.27 (0.19) -.33 (0.16)
Income .13** (0.00) .14** (0.01)
Job -.20 (0.36) -.23 (0.36)
Social class .17* (0.06) .19* (0.07)
Urbanization -.02 (0.73) -.02 (0.76)
Region -.45** (0.01) -.48** (0.02)
Optimist -.05 (0.67) -.05 (0.71)
ECB known 1.58** (0.00) 1.76** (0.00)
Economic job .86** (0.00) 1.02** (0.00)
Economic expert -.12 (0.70) -.27 (0.44)
Economic knowledge (SA) .97** (0.00) 1.12** (0.00)
Speciﬁc ﬁnancial knowledge (SA) .21 (0.13) .26 (0.10)
General ﬁnancial knowledge (SA) -.08 (0.62) -.07 (0.71)
Transparency knowledge (SA) .75** (0.00) .83** (0.00)
R2 0.32 0.31
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.30
Note: P-values between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a
5%-level. SA=self-assessed. See appendix A for the deﬁnitions of the explanatory
variables and the construction of KI_total and KI_total_alt.
Transparency knowledge is better for those respondents who are relatively old,
earning a relatively high income, belonging to a higher social class, not living in
17the West of the Netherlands (which is in contrast to their self-assessments) and
who know the ECB exists (before receiving a deﬁnition of the ECB). Economic
expertise is relevant in explaining actual transparency knowledge (as it was in
explaining assessed transparency knowledge). Actual transparency knowledge
is higher for those who are confronted with economic, monetary and ﬁnan-
cial matters during working hours, although this need not be on a daily basis,
and for those people assessing their economic knowledge to be relatively high.
Furthermore, it is found that those respondents who judge their transparency
knowledge to be higher do have better transparency knowledge in practice.7
However data inspection reveals that even those respondents who assess their
transparency knowledge to be very good possess some lack of or even incorrect
actual transparency knowledge.
The results are robust to a slight change in the manner in which actual trans-
parency is measured. Column 2 of Table 5 shows the results based on an alter-
native KI, which is a bit less stringent regarding those aspects of transparency
on which the right answer is debatable.
Next, we provide more insight into the eﬀect of economic "expertise" on trans-
parency knowledge.
4.3 Transparency knowledge and learning
One might argue that a perceptions mismatch is not present for economic ex-
perts. These economic experts would not have lacking or even incorrect knowl-
edge and not be subject to psychological biases. Based on the survey results,
we looked whether this is likely to be the case in practice. Both the depth and
correctness of the transparency knowledge of the economic "experts" among the
people in the household survey is tested. Two expert-deﬁnitions are used. Ac-
cording to the ﬁrst deﬁnition respondents are economic experts if they consider
their economic knowledge to be very good. Based on the second deﬁnition sur-
vey participants are economic experts when they deal with economic, ﬁnancial
or monetary matters on a daily basis.8
4.3.1 Economic expertise based on self-assessment
To get more feeling for the relevance of learning, Table 6 shows the results of
a comparison of the responses of two groups of people: the ones that perceive
to have good economic knowledge (25% of the respondents) and the ones who
assess their knowledge to be poor (22% of the respondents). A much lower
share of the people belonging to the good economic knowledge group answered
"I don’t know" (between 30 and 50%-points less). The majority of the extra "I
7This is in line with van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007) who ﬁnd that respondents
own assessments of their degree of ﬁnancial literacy are a good proxy for their actual
degree of ﬁnancial literacy.
8See Appendix B, Table B1 for an overview of the overlap between these two expert-
deﬁnitions.
18do know" answers of this group is correct but unfortunately not all of the extra
responses.9 Although performing the best compared to groups with a lower
degree of economic knowledge, even the "economic experts" (people who judge
their economic knowledge to be "very good") suﬀer from missing and incorrect
transparency knowledge. An overview of their responses is given in Appendix
B, Table B2.
Table 6. Actual knowledge about the ECB’s transparency and self-
assessed economic expertise
Diﬀerence in response shares of those people judging their own knowledge about
economic developments to be "good" (N=453) and those judging it to be "poor"
(N=404).
yes no I don’t
know
Political transparency
ECB’s goals laid down 40% ￿ 2% -43%
ECB’s main task is supporting the economy 13% 29% ￿ -42%
ECB’s main task is supporting price stability 32% ￿ 10% -42%
ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 11% ￿ 19% -30%
ECB is independent 34% ￿ 7% -41%
Economic transparency
ECB provides economic data 36% ￿ 6% -42%
ECB provides economic forecasts 38% ￿ 5% -43%
ECB provides economic models 27% ￿ 13% -40%
Procedural transparency
ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 23% ￿ 23% -46%
ECB provides comprehensive minutes 11% 24% ￿ -35%
ECB provides voting records -4% 34% ￿ -38%
Policy transparency
ECB announces interest rate decisions immediately 34% ￿ 12% -47%
ECB immediately explains the interest rate decision 36% ￿ 14% -50%
ECB tells future policy preferences 17% 26% ￿ -43%
Operational transparency
ECB provides information about relevant economic shocks 17% ￿ 16% -33%
ECB provides information about forecasting errors 10% 25% ￿ -35%
ECB provides information about its performance 27% 12% ￿ -39%
Note: The share of people in the "good" group is 25% and the share of people in
the "poor" group is 22%. The check mark (￿) indicates which answer is correct
according to EG(2006).
9A higher degree of optimism might both lead people to assess their economic knowl-
edge to be better as well as make them feel more conﬁdent about their transparency
knowledge.
194.3.2 Economic expertise based on work experience
Relevant work experience might cause some people to have a transparency
knowledge advantage. Knowledge about the transparency of the ECB is ex-
pected to be more important to the ones that in their day-to-day work are
confronted with economic, monetary or ﬁnancial matters. Our questionnaire
contains a question which asks for this. Possible answers (and the proportion of
respondents choosing the particular answer) are: "yes, every day" (11%), "yes,
but not every day" (19%) and "no" (70%).
Table 7. Actual knowledge about the ECB’s transparency and on
the job economic expertise
Response shares of those people confronted daily in their work with economic,
ﬁnancial or monetary aﬀairs (N=197).
yes no I don’t know
Political transparency
ECB’s goals laid down 66% ￿ 4% 29%
ECB’s main task is supporting the economy 32% 39% ￿ 28%
ECB’s main task is supporting price stability 57% ￿ 15% 28%
ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 18% ￿ 22% 60%
ECB is independent 50% ￿ 21% 29%
Economic transparency
ECB provides economic data 56% ￿ 8% 36%
ECB provides economic forecasts 58% ￿ 8% 34%
ECB provides economic models 37% ￿ 20% 43%
Procedural transparency
ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 31% ￿ 32% 37%
ECB provides comprehensive minutes 11% 26% ￿ 63%
ECB provides voting records 7% 42% ￿ 51%
Policy transparency
ECB announces interest rate decisions immediately 48% ￿ 15% 37%
ECB immediately explains the interest rate decision 45% ￿ 16% 39%
ECB tells future policy preferences 24% 28% ￿ 47%
Operational transparency
ECB provides information about relevant economic shocks 24% ￿ 25% 51%
ECB provides information about forecasting errors 10% 40% ￿ 50%
ECB provides information about its performance 35% 22% ￿ 43%
Note: People were asked whether they have on the job experience with economic,
ﬁnancial or monetary matters. Possible answers were: "yes, daily", "yes, but not
daily" and "no". This table presents the responses of the "yes, daily"-group, to
which 11% (N=197) of the respondents belongs. The check mark (￿) indicates which
answer is correct according to EG(2006).
20Taking a look at the 197 people in the "yes, every day" group (so belonging
to a still broadly deﬁned expert group, from administrators to managers), of
which the responses are presented in Table 7, several observations can be made.
The category "I don’t know" varies for diﬀerent statement about transparency.
Take for example the questions that measure knowledge about political trans-
parency. 71% of the respondents thinks they know whether the ECB can act
independently of governments, while only 40% reports to have knowledge about
whether the main target of the ECB is quantiﬁed. Absence of knowledge is
the least for political transparency questions (with the exception of knowledge
about whether the target is quantitative or not). Roughly speaking, of those
people responding the majority gives the correct answer. This does not hold for
categories for which the correct answer is disputable, as we saw before.
Detailed inspection of the data conﬁrms the ﬁndings in the previous section
based on assessed economic knowledge. People working daily with economic
matters report to have relatively more knowledge about transparency: the un-
known category is often about 30% smaller than in case of the people not work-
ing with economic matters. In addition, we observe a higher proportion of
correct and incorrect answers, but the increase of the amount correct answers
is higher.10
To summarize, experts have better transparency knowledge but it is far from
perfect. The misalignment of perceptions is likely to be a problem all over
the population. In the next Section we analyze to what extent transparency
knowledge matters in the formation of transparency perceptions.
5 Perceptions of central bank transparency
Perceptions of the ECB’s transparency are measured in two ways. First, Dutch
households were asked questions to measure their perceptions of the ECB’s
monetary policy transparency in general (Section 5.1). Second, transparency
perceptions about the various aspects on which the ECB could be transparent
are measured as well (Section 5.2).
5.1 General transparency perceptions
Perceived transparency may be misaligned because of two reasons: 1) knowledge
is incomplete or incorrect, and 2) psychological factors disturb the transmission
from knowledge to perceptions. Figure 3 gives an overview of the perceptions
persons have about the transparency of the ECB. These perceptions are mea-
sured on a 1 to 5 scale (ranging from "absolutely not transparent" to "very
transparent"). In addition there is an option "no opinion". 4 out of 10 peo-
ple do not report a view on the ECB’s monetary policy transparency, but the
10The diﬀerence of the answers of the "yes, every day"-group and the "yes, but not
every day"-group is smaller than the diﬀerence in the responses of the "yes, but not
every day"-group and the "no"-group. To get more feelings for the results a comparison
of the "yes, every day"-group and the "no"-group is presented in Table B3 of Appendix
B.
21ones that do report their perceptions have transparency perceptions which are

















Figure 3: ECB’s perceived transparency
Another question tests whether people are satisﬁed with the ECB’s amount of
transparency (again measured on a 1 to 5 scale plus a "no opinion" option).
Less than half of the people have an opinion on this matter (37%), which means
that for a substantial share of people the ECB cannot use the transmission
channel looked at in this paper. Of the people that do report their transparency
perceptions 40% is satisﬁed with the degree of transparency, almost 60% says
the ECB’s transparency is too low and only 3% thinks transparency is already
too high. Most people regard transparency of the ECB to be important (given
answers with the share of the total population between brackets: "absolutely not
important" (1%), "not important" (1%), "neutral" (12%), "important" (34%),
and "very important" (27%), "no opinion" (25%)). So even when people lack
knowledge about the ECB’s transparency this does not imply that they don’t
care. They might just not want to know all the details or it might be that the
information given by the ECB does not reach them.
We expect transparency knowledge to be an important, but imperfect, deter-
minant of transparency perceptions. Ordered probit regressions test for this.
Transparency knowledge is included in two ways in the regressions: 1) via the
self-assessed transparency knowledge, and 2) via the knowledge indices which
measure people’s actual transparency knowledge. A detailed description of the
design of these KI’s is presented in Appendix A, Table A2 and A3.
First, take a look at the regressions of the level of perceived ECB transparency
of which the results are presented in Table 8 (regression 1 is the baseline model).
Based on a sample of 960 respondents that do report their transparency percep-
tions, we ﬁnd that both transparency knowledge and psychological factors aﬀect
transparency perceptions. Starting with the latter, the more optimistic one is,
the higher is the perceived ECB’s transparency. In addition both self-assessed
22and actual transparency knowledge matter for the formation of transparency
perceptions. The higher the self-assessed transparency knowledge is, the higher
the transparency perceptions are. The eﬀect of actual transparency knowledge
depends on the aspect of transparency under consideration. Better knowledge
about the political, economic, and policy transparency of the ECB enhances the
extent to which it is perceived as a transparent institution. This is not surpris-
ing as the ECB is relatively transparent on these aspects. In contrast, more
knowledge about the ECB’s procedural and operational transparency reduces
the extent to which it is perceived as transparent. Again this is an intuitive
ﬁnding because the ECB ’s degree of actual procedural and operational trans-
parency is relatively low.
Table 8. Perceived ECB transparency: ordered probit analyses
(1) (2) (3)
Optimist .15** (0.00) .14** (0.00) .16** (0.00)
Transparency knowledge (SA) .43** (0.00) .44** (0.00) .51** (0.00)
KI_political .09** (0.00)
KI_economic .10** (0.00) .11** (0.00) .11** (0.00)
KI_procedural -.09* (0.06)
KI_policy .18** (0.00) .21** (0.00) .24** (0.00)
KI_operational -.16** (0.00)
KI_political_alt .10** (0.00) .11** (0.00)
KI_procedural_alt -.21** (0.00) -.20** (0.00)






Social class .02 (0.61)
Urbanization .03 (0.30)
Region -.13 (0.11)
ECB known -.08 (0.40)
Economic job .03 (0.72)
Economic expert -.20* (0.09)
Economic knowledge (SA) -.09* (0.10)
Log likelihood -1056 -1048 -1017
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10 0.11
N 960 960 940
Note: P-values between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a
5%-level. SA=self-assessed. Perceptions of the ECB’s transparency are measured
on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=absolutely not transparent, 2=not transparent, 3=neutral,
4=transparent, 5=very transparent). The respondents with "no opinion" (N=799) are
not included in the analysis. The deﬁnitions of the explanatory variables can be found
in Appendix A.
23In regression 2 (in Table 8) we used a diﬀerent way to construct the political,
procedural and operational KI’s than in the baseline regression. Now (I) both
answering the ECB having its main target quantiﬁed and answering that it has
not are judged to be correct, (II) both answering that the ECB’s interest rate
decisions are and are not made in a clear fashion are judged to be correct, and
(III) both saying that the ECB does and does not provide a direction for future
policy are judged to be correct. We ﬁnd that (I) does not make a big diﬀerence,
(II) leads actual procedural transparency knowledge to push down perceived
transparency even more, and (III) leads actual operational transparency knowl-
edge to lower perceived transparency less.
In regression 3 we add several control variables. The ﬁt of the model slightly
improves. The higher the age is, the lower perceived ECB transparency is.
People with a paid job have relatively lower transparency perceptions. An
interesting ﬁnding is that transparency perceptions are negatively related to
economic expertise, both daily work experience with economic, monetary or
ﬁnancial matters as well high self-assessed economic knowledge.
We performed a similar analysis with the results of the question that asked for
people’s satisfaction with the ECB’s transparency. A share of 15% is satisﬁed,
22% is dissatisﬁed and the majority (64%) has no opinion. Of the dissatisﬁed
people, the majority ﬁnds transparency too low (N=381). As only 11 people
report that the ECB’s transparency is too high, they could not be included in
the probit analyses. The results, which are presented in Appendix C, are to a
large extent similar to the above results. An important diﬀerence however is that
although economic expertise is related to lower transparency perceptions it does
not seem to be relevant for people’s satisfaction with the ECB’s transparency.
Overall, when the ECB wants to (1) enhance the extent to which it is perceived
as being transparent and (2) people’s satisfaction with transparency, it should
focus on communicating about those aspects on which its transparency score is
high: political, economic and policy transparency. In contrast the ECB should
not emphasize its lack of procedural and operational transparency. To get more
insight into the perceived transparency, we investigated whether transparency
perceptions diﬀer across various aspects.
5.2 Detailed transparency perceptions
We asked survey participants to ﬁll in their perceptions of the ECB’s trans-
parency on various aspects of monetary policy making (again on a scale from
1 to 5 plus the option "I don’t know"). When we combine the results of this
part of the questionnaire with the results we found about the transparency
knowledge of respondents we derive some useful insights. The share of people
who report their transparency perceptions is larger than the share that report to
have knowledge on the various aspects of transparency. Which means that some
people form perceptions of transparency, even without having actual knowledge
about it. This conﬁrms the idea that the formation of transparency percep-
tions is not obvious and depends on both psychological factors and individual


































Figure 4: ECB’s perceived transparency
Note: The share of people that did not have a view on the ECB’s monetary policy
transparency is for all aspects about 55%.
About half the people report no transparency perceptions. The share of people
that view the ECB as (absolutely) not transparent ranges from 9% (economic
transparency) to 17% (future policy transparency). This ﬁnding is in line with
the group of people answering that the ECB is (very) transparent. The share
of people choosing for this option is about the same (it varies between 9%
and 20%), with the highest share going to economic transparency and the low-
est share to future policy transparency. As Table 9 shows ECB transparency is
perceived to be relatively high on economic, current policy and political aspects,
whereas procedural, operational and future policy transparency is perceived to
be relatively low. The ranking of these transparency aspects based on per-
ceptions is roughly in line with the actual transparency practice of the ECB,
although two observations are important. First, about half of the people do not
have a view on transparency. Second, even on those aspects which the ECB
emphasizes in its communication and on which it received the maximum score
based on the EG-index, a substantial amount of people still judge the ECB to
be intransparent.
11We make a distinction between current and future monetary policy transparency,
as the degree of transparency of the ECB is high on the former but low on the latter
because forward-looking transparency is more diﬃcult.
25Table 9. Perceived ECB transparency on various aspects
"absolutely not transparent" "transparent" and ranking
and "not transparent" "very transparent"
economic 9% < 20% 1
policy (current) 11% < 18% 2
political 10% < 16% 3
procedural 15% > 11% 4
operational 14% > 10% 4
policy (future) 17% > 9% 6
Note: About 55% of the people did not have a view on this issue and the rest (around
20%) has responded "neutral".
Targeted communication may reduce the transparency misalignment by raising
the transparency knowledge. But to the extent that psychological factors cause
misaligned perceptions, a revised communication policy will not be helpful be-
cause people are unaware of these biases. Before coming into action however, it
is important to know the degree to which misaligned transparency perceptions
matter.
6 The relevance of transparency perceptions
Based on survey data on the ECB’s transparency we can conclude that a mis-
match between actual and perceived transparency exists. Next we investigate
to what extent this mismatch is relevant. In addition to the "moral obligation"
of the central bank as a public institution to improve the transparency knowl-
edge of the public, and thereby bringing the transparency perceptions more in
line with reality, there might be some economic gains related to it as well. To
check wether this is indeed the case, we ﬁrst look at the relationship between
transparency perceptions and trust in the ECB in Subsection 6.1. Thereafter
the link to inﬂation perceptions and expectations is made in Subsection 6.2.
6.1 Trust in the European Central Bank
Survey participants report to have more trust in the Dutch central bank com-
pared to the ECB, which may be explained by the presence of a familiarity
bias: people have more trust in institutions they know better and that are less
distant. Possible answers and the percentage of people responding it are (in
case of the ECB): "absolutely no trust" (1%), "little trust" (10%), "neutral"
(36%), "quite a lot" (29%), "a lot" (7%), "no opinion" (18%). We investigated
the role of transparency perceptions in explaining people’s trust in the ECB by
estimating an ordered probit regression.
In our analysis we include both a direct (Table 10, model 1a and 1b) as well
as an indirect measure of trust (model 2). We observe that the direct measure
of trust in the ECB is indeed related to central bank transparency perceptions.
The higher the perceptions of the ECB’s transparency, the higher the trust in
26the ECB. This result highlights the importance of transparency perceptions as
central banks are interested in keeping up people’s trust. It eases their policy
making and increases their eﬀectiveness. Other factors are relevant in explaining
trust as well. From the probit regression, holding other factors constant, trust in
the ECB is higher the higher educated and more optimistic people are and the
higher their self-assessed transparency knowledge is. Trust in the ECB is higher
for those respondents that reported to know the ECB before we explained to
them what the ECB is and does.
Table 10. Trust in the ECB: ordered probit analyses
Direct measure of trust Indirect measure of
trust
(1a) (1b) (2)
Age .00 (0.17) -.00 (0.80) -.00 (0.16)
Gender .03 (0.77) -.01 (0.84) .06 (0.55)
Education .16* (0.06) .16** (0.03) .06 (0.50)
Income .03 (0.12) .04** (0.02) .01 (0.46)
Job .11 (0.25) -.05 (0.54) -.20* (0.07)
Social class .02 (0.67) .04 (0.22) .04 (0.36)
Urbanization -.03 (0.34) -.02 (0.42) -.02 (0.56)
Region -.11 (0.15) -.18** (0.00) -.11 (0.18)
Optimist .18** (0.00) .20** (0.00) .12** (0.02)
ECB known .33** (0.00) .23** (0.00) -.49** (0.00)
Economic job -.07 (0.41) -.18** (0.02) -.08 (0.48)
Economic expert .10 (0.37) .15 (0.13) -.03 (0.79)
Economic knowledge (SA) .08* (0.09) .05 (0.19) .08 (0.54)






Log likelihood -1082 -1670 -878
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.06 0.08
N 936 1414 806
Note: P-values are between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a
5%-level. SA=self-assessed. A description of the explanatory variables can be found
in Appendix A. Model 1a and 1b use a direct measure of trust in the ECB. The scale
of this measure of trust ranges from 1 to 5 (1="absolutely no trust", 2="little trust",
3="neutral", 4="quite a lot" and 5="a lot"). Model 2 uses an indirect measure of
trust: the extent to which people feel the ECB is safeguarding price stability (1="not"
(1%), 2="not very good" (10%), 3="neutral" (26%), 4="good" (20%) and 5="very
good" (0%)).
Model 1b includes transparency perceptions in an indirect manner by including
27transparency knowledge indices.12 Political, economic and policy transparency
knowledge (aspects of transparency on which the ECB scores relatively high) are
signiﬁcantly positively related to trust whereas operational transparency knowl-
edge (an aspect on which the ECB degree of transparency is low) is negatively
related to trust. As transparency knowledge is only one of the determinants of
perceived transparency, model 1b has less explanatory power than model 1a.
Therefore we prefer to include transparency perceptions in a direct way.
In addition to the direct measure of respondents’ trust in the ECB, we have
used an indirect measure of trust. Respondents were asked the extent to which
they feel the ECB is safeguarding price stability. Quite a lot of people say they
have no clue (42%). A neutral standpoint is taken by 26% of people. Of the
remaining, a share of 2/3 says the ECB is safeguarding price stability well while
a share of 1/3 is dissatisﬁed. The responses of those respondents that did report
an opinion are explained with an ordered probit model of which the results are
presented in Table 10 model 2. Ceteris paribus, people are more satisﬁed with
the extent to which the ECB safeguards price stability when they have no paid
job, are more optimistic, have higher transparency perceptions and know the
ECB beforehand.
Overall, we ﬁnd that transparency perceptions are signiﬁcantly related to both
the direct measure of trust in the ECB as well as to the indirect measure of
trust (the extent to which the ECB is safeguarding price stability).13
6.2 Inﬂation gap and credibility gap
What matters then is if trust is indeed related to inﬂation perceptions and
inﬂation expectations. When judging current inﬂation, opinions are nicely dis-
tributed around neutral. This is not in line with the picture we obtain when
we ask survey participants to quantify their transparency perceptions and ex-
pectations. Persons were asked to report their perceptions of current consumer
price inﬂation and their expectations of future inﬂation (in the medium term: 2
years). The responses show a peak around 2% but are skewed upwards, which
is in line with previous research of Christensen et al. (2006). Some people
probably do not understand the concept of percentages as one would ﬁnd it
hard to believe that they really perceive and expect inﬂation to be over 50%.
Responses vary a lot as is shown in Appendix D. Respondents judge future inﬂa-
tion (in 2 years time) higher than current inﬂation, which suggests that inﬂation
expectations are not perfectly anchored.
To measure to what extent trust is related to inﬂation perceptions and expec-
tations, we tried to explain the "inﬂation gap" and the "credibility gap". The
inﬂation gap is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between perceived and actual current
inﬂation. As a measure of actual inﬂation we take the consumer price index
12It is for this reason that we could include less observations in model 1b compared
to model 1a.
13It should be noted that we cannot be sure whether and to what extent the rela-
tionship between trust and transparency perceptions is in the other direction.
28of May: 1.8%. Table 11 column 1 gives the regression results based on 1143
observations.








t) correctness of π
p
t
Age -.04** (0.01) -.04** (0.00) -.01** (0.02)
Gender -.87** (0.04) -.93** (0.02) -.21** (0.01)
Education -.25 (0.56) -.26 (0.53) .07 (0.41)
Income -.06 (0.49) -.07 (0.40) -.02 (0.21)
Job -1.20** (0.01) -1.21** (0.01) -.25** (0.01)
Social class -.31 (0.11) -.35* (0.07) -.08** (0.03)
Urbanization .08 (0.58) .08 (0.56) -.03 (0.35)
Region -.55 (0.15) -.55 (0.14) -.03 (0.68)
Optimist -.35 (0.14) -.33 (0.15) .02 (0.62)
ECB known -1.29** (0.00) -1.45** (0.00) -.37** (0.00)
Economic job .51 (0.24) .45 (0.29) -.09 (0.33)
Economic expert -.32 (0.57) -.37 (0.51) -.04 (0.77)
Economic knowledge (SA) .22 (0.33) .24 (0.27) -.10** (0.03)
Trust -.37* (0.08) -.34* (0.10) -.22** (0.00)
Constant 4.35** (0.01) 4.36** (0.01) 1.27** (0.00)
Model type OLS OLS probit
R2 0.05 0.06
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05
Pseudo R2 0.08
Log likelihood -859
N 1143 1143 1414
Note: P-values between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a
5%-level. SA=self-assessed. See Appendix A for an explanation of the independent
variables. Explanation of the dependent variables:





t= perceived current inﬂation (percentage), πa
t=
actual current inﬂation, which equals 1.8% (Consumer Price Index of May 2007);




(3) correctness of inﬂation perceptions: 0 if π
p
t ∈ [1.5,2.1], 1 otherwise (including the
"I don’t know" responses).
The inﬂation gap is more likely to be smaller or even negative (perceived inﬂation
lower than actual inﬂation) when one is older, male, having a paid job, and
when knowing the ECB and having more trust in it. The same factors plus
the social class one belongs to signiﬁcantly explain the absolute value of the
inﬂation gap, a measure of the extent to which the given answer was close to
actual inﬂation, no matter whether perceptions were too high or too low (see
column 2 of Table 11). Column 3 shows the results of a probit regression used to
explain the correctness of inﬂation perceptions. The sample size is now larger as
those people who choose "I don’t know" could now be included in the analysis
29(belonging to those people with incorrect transparency perceptions). Inﬂation
perceptions were judged to be correct if they were between 1.5% and 2.1%.
In addition to the characteristics that matters in regression 1 and 2, economic
knowledge now signiﬁcantly relates to the correctness of inﬂation perceptions.
Inﬂation perceptions are more in line with reality for those people that have a
higher degree of self-assessed economic knowledge.
The credibility gap is the diﬀerence between the inﬂation expected within two
years and the inﬂation target of the ECB. The regression results are in Table
12.







t+2) correctness of πe
t+2
Age -.03* (0.05) -.03** (0.04) -.01 (0.11)
Gender -.57 (0.19) -.67 (0.11) -.14 (0.12)
Education -.17 (0.69) -.18 (0.68) .01 (0.94)
Income -.11 (0.25) -.09 (0.31) -.01 (0.69)
Job -.87* (0.08) -.95* (0.05) .04 (0.69)
Social class -.50** (0.01) -.57** (0.00) -.02 (0.68)
Urbanization .17 (0.25) .17 (0.23) -.01 (0.65)
Region -.57 (0.15) -.55 (0.16) .03 (0.71)
Optimist -.33 (0.17) -.29 (0.22) .08 (0.15)
ECB known -.86* (0.06) -1.02** (0.03) -0.21** (0.04)
Economic job .78* (0.08) .71 (0.10) -.01 (0.95)
Economic expert .31 (0.60) .24 (0.68) -.11 (0.41)
Economic knowledge (SA) -.07 (0.76) -.05 (0.82) -.11** (0.03)
Trust -.44** (0.04) -.43** (0.04) -.21** (0.00)
Constant 5.42** (0.00) 5.29** (0.00) 1.65** (0.00)
Model type OLS OLS probit
R2 0.05 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04
Pseudo R2 0.05
Log likelihood -696
N 1112 1112 1414
Note: P-values between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a
5%-level. SA=self-assessed. See Appendix A for an explanation of the independent
variables. Explanation of the dependent variables:
(1) the credibility gap: πe
t+2 − πT
t+2. πe
t+2= expected inﬂation two years from now
(percentage), πT
t+2= the ECB’s medium term inﬂation target, which is set at 1.9%;
(2) the absolute value of the inﬂation gap: abs(πe
t+2 − πT
t+2);
(3) correctness of inﬂation expectations: 0 if πe
t ∈ [1.8,2], 1 otherwise (including the
"I don’t know" responses).
In column 1 it is shown that the credibility gap is lower for those who are older,
having a job, belonging to a higher social class, knowing the ECB and having
30an economic job. Trust is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable of the inﬂation
gap. Similar factors play a role in explaining the absolute diﬀerence between
inﬂation expectations and the inﬂation target of the ECB (column 2 of Table 12).
The last column of Table 12 explains the "correctness"of respondents’ inﬂation
expectations in the sense of being in line with the inﬂation target of the ECB.
Self-assessed economic knowledge, knowing the ECB and trust play a signiﬁcant
role in explaining the correctness of respondents’ inﬂation expectations.
To summarize, trust is both a relevant factor for both keeping inﬂation per-
ceptions low and in line with reality and for anchoring inﬂation expectations
around the central bank’s target.14 Though to the extent that transparency
perceptions matter for trust, they are relevant based on economic arguments
too. Transparency perceptions are signiﬁcant too when included in a direct
manner in the correctness of inﬂation perceptions and expectations regressions
instead of trust (see Appendix D). However the explanatory power of the models
is lower as trust in the ECB depends on more factors than only transparency
perceptions. Therefore other ways in which to improve trust in the ECB will
be helpful as well.
7 Conclusion
In this paper it is argued that a mismatch between the actual degree of trans-
parency of a central bank and its degree of transparency as perceived by the
public is likely to exist and that it matters. Transparency perceptions are based
on two factors: (1) actual knowledge of transparency, and (2) psychological
factors.
Regarding determinant (1), based on a survey among Dutch households on the
ECB’s transparency it is shown that actual knowledge is lacking or even in-
correct, which is a ﬁrst evidence for a mismatch between actual and perceived
transparency. We ﬁnd strong indications that this lack of depth and correctness
of transparency knowledge is not only present for the public at large, but also
for those agents whom the central bank is more keen on inﬂuencing: ﬁnancial
experts. Both expert deﬁnitions we use (having an economic job and having a
very high self-assessed economic knowledge) conﬁrm this viewpoint. Depending
on which aspect of transparency it is looked at 46%-72% of the respondents
report that they have no idea about the current transparency practice of the
ECB. A majority of the respondents that do report to have knowledge possess
the correct knowledge, whereas the rest has incorrect transparency knowledge.
About some aspects of transparency knowledge is higher than on others. Dutch
households know more about for example the goals of the central bank and the
economic information it provides (aspects on which the ECB is relatively trans-
parent) than about whether minutes are published and forecast errors are made
public (aspects on which the ECB is relatively intransparent). When we correct
14We should note however that it is unclear whether and to what extent the rela-
tionship between inﬂation peceptions and trust moves in two directions.
31for the fact that we have a slight overrepresentation of males, highly educated
people, older people, and higher income households transparency knowledge is
even a bit worse in practice.
Regarding determinant (2), psychological factors seem to matter in the for-
mation of transparency perceptions. For example, optimistic people are more
inclined to judge ECB’s transparency to be high. The share of people reporting
transparency perceptions is larger than the share of people reporting to have
knowledge about transparency. So even without exact knowledge people form
perceptions about the ECB’s transparency. The ﬁnding that transparency per-
ceptions do not only depends on actual transparency knowledge complicates
it for central banks to align transparency perceptions with their actual trans-
parency practice.
Transparency perceptions matter as they are signiﬁcantly positively related to
the amount of trust in the ECB. This results highlights the importance of trans-
parency perceptions as central banks are interested in keeping up people’s trust.
It eases their policy making and increases their eﬀectiveness. We ﬁnd that when
households’ trust in the ECB is higher inﬂation perceptions are more in line with
actual inﬂation and inﬂation expectations are better anchored around the inﬂa-
tion target of the ECB, which eases policy-making. The indirect transmission
channel analyzed in this paper (from transparency perceptions to the economic
outcomes) though seems to be relevant. It is however absent for the majority of
the population, but less so for people with relatively high economic "expertise"
in whom the ECB is interested the most.
The central bank has an accountability obligation to the public and fulﬁlls it
by being transparent. In order to do this as best as possible a closer match
between the actual and perceived degree of transparency is welcomed. Despite
this "moral" obligation to bring transparency perceptions in line with the ECB’s
practice, the central bank might feel a perverse incentive to keep transparency
perceptions misaligned in case they are higher than its actual transparency
practice. To beneﬁt from higher transparency perceptions the ECB might feel
tempted to stress its transparency strengths (political, economic and policy
transparency), but de-emphasize its transparency weaknesses (procedural and
operational transparency).15 However, it might not be so easy to develop one
communication strategy that works because the manner in which perceptions
are being formed is likely to diﬀer between agents and perceptions not only
depend on transparency knowledge but on psychological factors as well.
15An alternative would be to improve its actual procedural and operational trans-
parency but this might be much more diﬃcult and costly to achieve.
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34A Description of the explanatory variables
Table A1. Various explanatory variables
Variable Measurement
Age 2007-year of birth
Gender 1=male; 0=female
Education 1=higher vocational education or university education;
0=primary education/preparatory intermediate vocational edu-
cation/secondary pre-university education or intermediate voca-
tional education
Income 12 classes from gross monthly income of less than € 500 to more
than € 7500
Job status 1=paid job; 0=other
Social class scale from 1 to 5 (1= low; 5= high)
Urbanization scale from 1 to 5 (1=not urbanised; 5=very strong urbanisation)
Region 0=North (Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe), East (Overijs-
sel, Flevoland and Gelderland), and South (Noord-Brabant and
Limburg); 1= West (Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and
Zeeland).
Optimist self-assessment, scale from 1 to 5 (1= very pessimistic; 5= very
optimistic)
Economic knowledge (SA) self-assessed knowledge about economic developments like price
changes, economic growth and unemployment, scale from 1 to 5
(1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=neutral; 4=good; 5=very good)
Speciﬁc ﬁnancial knowledge (SA) self-assessed knowledge about their own ﬁnancial situations,
scale from 1 to 5 (1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=neutral; 4=good;
5=very good)
General ﬁnancial knowledge (SA) self-assessed knowledge about ﬁnancial matters in general, scale
from 1 to 5 (1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=neutral; 4=good; 5=very
good)
Transparency knowledge (SA) self-assessed knowledge about the transparency of the ECB,
scale from 1 to 5 (1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=neutral; 4=good;
5=very good)
ECB known 1=ECB is known; 0=ECB is not known
Economic job job experience with monetary, ﬁnancial or monetary matters (0
= no; 1= yes)
Economic expert daily job experience with monetary, ﬁnancial or monetary mat-
ters (0= not daily or not at all; 1= yes, daily)
Note: Multicollinearity is not a problem. The mean Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF)
is 1.58 (minimum is 1.03 and the maximum is 2.37 with N=1519). As a rule of thumb
a VIF smaller than 10 is ﬁne.
35Table A2. Knowledge Indicators (KI)
possible answers and the
scores attached to them
yes no I don’t know
Political
KI1a ECB’s goals laid down 1 0 0
KI1b ECB’s main task is supporting the economy 0 1 0
KI1c ECB’s main task is supporting price stability 1 0 0
KI1d ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 1 0 0
KI1dalt ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 1 1 0
KI1e ECB is independent 1 0 0
Economic
KI2a ECB provides economic data 1 0 0
KI2b ECB provides economic forecasts 1 0 0
KI2c ECB provides economic models 1 0 0
Procedural
KI3a ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 1 0 0
KI3aalt ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 1 1 0
KI3b ECB provides comprehensive minutes 0 1 0
KI3c ECB provides voting records 0 1 0
Policy
KI4a ECB announces interest rate decisions immediately 1 0 0
KI4b ECB immediately explains the interest rate decision 1 0 0
KI4c ECB tells future policy preferences 0 1 0
Operational
KI5a ECB provides information about relevant economic shocks 1 0 0
KI5b ECB provides information about forecasting errors 0 1 0
KI5c ECB provides information about its performance 0 1 0
KI5calt ECB provides information about its performance 1 1 0
36Table A3. Transparency knowledge indices
Variable Description Range
KI_political knowledge index about the ECB’s
policital transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 5
(all questions good)
KI_economic knowledge index about the ECB’s
economic transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 3
(all questions good)
KI_procedural knowledge index about the ECB’s
procedural transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 3
(all questions good)
KI_policy knowledge index about the ECB’s
policy transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 3
(all questions good)
KI_operational knowledge index about the ECB’s
operational transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 3
(all questions good)
KI_political_alt alternative knowledge index about
the ECB’s policital transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 5
(all questions good)
KI_procedural_alt alternative knowledge index about
the ECB’s procedural transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 3
(all questions good)
KI_operational_alt alternative knowledge index
about the ECB’s operational
transparency
from 0 (all questions wrong) to 3
(all questions good)
KI_total aggregate knowledge index from 0 (all questions wrong) to 15
(all questions good)
= 0.6*KI_political + KI_economic
+ KI_procedural + KI_policy +
KI_operational
KI_total_alt alternative aggregate knowledge in-
dex






B Expertise and knowledge about the ECB’s
transparency
Table B1. Overlap between economic job and economic knowledge
Share of respondent (in %)
I \ II very poor poor neutral good very good I don’t know
yes, daily 2% 7% 34% 52% 6% 0%
yes, but not daily 2% 9% 42% 42% 4% 1%
no 8% 28% 39% 16% 1% 8%
Note: I) Job experience with economic, ﬁnancial or monetary matters. II) self-assessed
economic knowledge.
37Table B2. Actual knowledge about the ECB’s transparency and self-
assessed economic expertise
Response shares of those people judging their own knowledge about economic





ECB’s goals laid down 88% ￿ 3% 8%
ECB’s main task is supporting the economy 44% 53% ￿ 3%
ECB’s main task is supporting price stability 86% ￿ 14% 0%
ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 31% ￿ 44% 25%
ECB is independent 89% ￿ 3% 8%
Economic transparency
ECB provides economic data 75% ￿ 8% 17%
ECB provides economic forecasts 72% ￿ 11% 17%
ECB provides economic models 53% ￿ 22% 25%
Procedural transparency
ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 56% ￿ 39% 6%
ECB provides comprehensive minutes 36% 39% ￿ 25%
ECB provides voting records 8% 72% ￿ 19%
Policy transparency
ECB announces interest rate decisions immediately 58% ￿ 33% 8%
ECB immediately explains the interest rate decision 72% ￿ 17% 11%
ECB tells future policy preferences 28% 47% ￿ 25%
Operational transparency
ECB provides information about relevant economic shocks 22% ￿ 56% 22%
ECB provides information about forecasting errors 8% 64% ￿ 28%
ECB provides information about its performance 50% 33% ￿ 17%
Note: People were asked to judge their own knowledge about economic developments,
like price changes, economic growth and unemployment. Possible answers were: "very
poor", "poor", "neutral", "good", "very good", "I don’t know". This table presents
the response shares of the group "very good", which contains only 2% of the respon-
dents, answering "yes", "no" and "I don’t know" on the transparency questions. The
check mark (￿) indicates which answer is correct according to EG(2006).
38Table B3. Actual knowledge about the ECB’s transparency and on
the job economic expertise
Diﬀerence in response shares of those people confronted daily in their work with
economic, ﬁnancial or monetary aﬀairs (N=197), and those never faced with
these matters (N=1264).
yes no I don’t
know
Political transparency
ECB’s goals laid down 31% ￿ 2% -33%
ECB’s main task is supporting the economy 2% 25% ￿ -27%
ECB’s main task is supporting price stability 17% ￿ 8% -26%
ECB’s main goal expressed by a number 10% ￿ 6% -15%
ECB is independent 22% ￿ 5% -28%
Economic transparency
ECB provides economic data 25% ￿ 3% -28%
ECB provides economic forecasts 26% ￿ 3% -29%
ECB provides economic models 17% ￿ 11% -29%
Procedural transparency
ECB’s interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion 18% ￿ 11% -30%
ECB provides comprehensive minutes 2% 11% ￿ -14%
ECB provides voting records 4% 20% ￿ -24%
Policy transparency
ECB announces interest rate decisions immediately 22% ￿ 6% -28%
ECB immediately explains the interest rate decision 21% ￿ 9% -30%
ECB tells future policy preferences 15% 13% ￿ -29%
Operational transparency
ECB provides information about relevant economic shocks 11% ￿ 15% -25%
ECB provides information about forecasting errors 4% 22% ￿ -26%
ECB provides information about its performance 17% 13% ￿ -30%
Note: The share of people in the "yes, daily" group is 11% and the share of people
in the "no" group is 70% (the rest answered "yes, but not daily"). The check mark
(￿) indicates which answer is correct according to EG(2006).
39C Satisfaction with the ECB’s transparency
Table C1. Satisfaction with the ECB’s transparency: probit analyses
(1) (2) (3)
Optimist .19** (0.01) .17** (0.02) .20** (0.01)
Transparency knowledge (SA) .50** (0.00) .51** (0.00) .46** (0.00)
KI_political .14** (0.00)
KI_economic .10* (0.05) .12** (0.03) .10* (0.06)
KI_procedural -.19** (0.00)
KI_policy .22** (0.00) .26** (0.00) .24** (0.00)
KI_operational -.26** (0.00)
KI_political_alt .17** (0.00) .18** (0.00)
KI_procedural_alt -.38** (0.00) -.34** (0.00)






Social class .06 (0.30)
Urbanization -.09** (0.04)
Region -.06 (0.62)
ECB known -.32 (0.06)
Economic job -.09 (0.47)
Economic expert .15 (0.34)
Economic knowledge (SA) -.10 (0.23)
Log likelihood -366 -355 -395
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.18 0.16
N 637 637 636
Note: P-values are between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant
at a 5%-level. SA=self-assessed. Satisfaction with the transparency of the ECB is
measured as follows: 1="yes, satisﬁed" (N=264); 0="no, not enough transparency"
(N=381). "No opinion" (N=1144) and "too much transparency" (N=11) are not
included in the analyses, although the results are robust to making 1="all dissatisﬁed
people". The deﬁnitions of the explanatory variables can be found in Appendix A.
40D Inﬂation perceptions and expectations
Perceived current consumer price inflation (%)






























































Figure 5: Perceived inﬂation
Note: The vertical axes contains all the diﬀerent answers given to the question: "How
high do you judge yearly inﬂation (the average percentage increase of the consumer
price compared to a year ago) in The Netherlands at the moment?". On the horizontal
axis, the percentage of people choosing a particular inﬂation rate is reported.
41Expected future consumer price inflation (%)




































































Figure 6: Expected inﬂation
Note: The vertical axes contains all the diﬀerent answers given to the question: "How
high do you judge yearly inﬂation (the average percentage increase of the consumer
price compared to a year ago) in The Netherlands in the medium term (2 years from
now)?". On the horizontal axis, the percentage of people choosing a particular inﬂation
rate is reported.
42Table D1. Correctness of inﬂation perceptions and expectations:




t correctness of πe
t+2
Age -.01 (0.12) -.01** (0.01)
Gender -.15 (0.14) -.24** (0.04)
Education -.01 (0.92) -.09 (0.40)
Income -.02 (0.32) .02 (0.35)
Job -.20* (0.08) .01 (0.97)
Social class -.08* (0.09) -.02 (0.75)
Urbanization -.03 (0.44) .04 (0.34)
Region .00 (1.00) .06 (0.58)
Optimist .01 (0.85) .02 (0.75)
ECB known -.41** (0.00) -.29** (0.03)
Economic job -.00 (0.99) .03 (0.78)
Economic expert -.08 (0.56) -.12 (0.41)
Economic knowledge (SA) -.09 (0.12) -.10* (0.10)
Transparency perceptions -.13** (0.01) -.12** (0.03)
Constant .70* (0.10) 1.75** (0.00)
Model type probit probit
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04
Log likelihood -625 -502
N 964 964
Note: P-values between brackets. *=signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. **=signiﬁcant at a
5%-level. SA=self-assessed. See Appendix A for an explanation of the independent
variables. Explanation of the dependent variables:
(1) correctness of inﬂation perceptions: 0 if π
p
t ∈ [1.5,2.1], 1 otherwise (including the
"I don’t know" responses).
(2) correctness of inﬂation expectations: 0 if πe
t ∈ [1.8,2], 1 otherwise (including the
"I don’t know" responses).
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